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"Freeborn" John Lilburne defied his first "establishment" at the age
of seventeen. He sued Hewson, the master to whom he was appren-
ticed, before the Lord Chamberlain of London for showering abuse
upon him. During the stormy years which followed, Lilburne tilted
with the Star Chamber, committees of the House of Commons, the
Council of State and Cromwell's judicial commissioners. He wore
himself out by his determined opposition to those in power at the
comparatively early age of forty-three. Had this not occurred, Lil-
burne certainly would have made Charles II a "gloomy" rather than
a "merry" monarch. Perhaps he would have ended his days, not in
prison at Dover, but banished to Massachusetts, where those who of-
fended Charles were likely to be sent. There he unquestionably would
have contributed to the already considerable discomforts of the Pil-
grim Fathers.
When, in 1637, Lilburne was arrested at the age of twenty-three
by pursuivants of the Stationers' Company and tried before the Star
Chamber for shipping seditious books from Holland to England, he
stoutly refused to take the ex officio oath on the ground he should not
be made to accuse himself. The Court of Star Chamber consisted of
the judicial members of the Privy Council. At the time Lilburne was
brought before it, the Court had a reputation for fairness in proce-
dure and speed in decision-making that attracted many litigants to it
from the common law courts. In criminal cases over which it had ju-
risdiction-these being for the most part cases under special statutes
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or cases which could not be tried satisfactorily by the common law
juries-the Court also enjoyed a reputation for diligence in proce-
dure, soundness of decision and restraint in punishment.
In the regular Star Chamber criminal procedure, the defendant was
informed of the charges against him and was permitted to reply by
counsel. He was then required to swear the ex officio oath that he
would tell the truth to questions put to him. He was interrogated in
private. While he could offer witnesses in his behalf, these also were
examined privately under oath. When the evidence was taken, there
was a public trial without a jury, the defendant again being entitled
to counsel.
The Star Chamber nevertheless tried some cases in summary fash-
ion. The details of these summary procedures varied, but were de-
scribed generally as procedures ore tenus and could be initiated only
by the Attorney General. Cases tried ore tenus seemed to be those in
which the defendant admitted all of the facts or cases in which some
matter of state security was involved.
Lilburne had been examined by the Attorney General before being
sent to the Star Chamber but had not made a full confession. Nor did
his case involve any major matter of state security. Nevertheless, the
Attorney General had not provided Lilburne with a bill of complaint
setting forth the charges. When the Court sought to put him to the
oath, he would have none of it. The procedure was that of the Court
of High Commission, an institution which Puritans of Lilburne's day
saw not as a court but as an instrument for suppressing dissent.
By the ex officio oath as used in the Court of High Commission, the
defendant was always sworn before knowing the charges against him
and his accusers. If the defendant took the oath, the High Commission
would then proceed to question him, perhaps disclosing grounds of
prosecution not previously known to the Court or, a matter usually
more important, disclosing the persons with whom the defendant con-
spired or acted. The facts developed by the High Commission might
be used as the basis for an indictment and a trial at common law or
as a basis for an information in the Star Chamber. Sometimes the
matter was one which the High Commission itself could try.
If the defendant refused the oath in the High Commission, he could
be placed in jail for contempt. Alternatively, in Lilburne's time, the
Court might find the defendant guilty pro confesso, on an inference
of guilt arising from his failure to swear. The Star Chamber followed
a similar procedure if the defendant balked, and for Lilbume's con-
tempt fined him, sentenced him to be whipped, placed in the pillory
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and returned to jail until he purged himself. The Court might, at this
time, have had him branded or his ears cropped, but even if he had
been found guilty, could not have sentenced him to loss of life or limb.
The High Commission, by contrast, could pass a capital sentence in
an appropriate case within its jurisdiction.
Tied to a cart and whipped during an ordeal of two miles from the
Fleet prison to Westminster, Lilburne there had his neck thrust into
the yoke of the pillory. Uncowed, he delivered a fiery speech to the
onlookers, condemning the ex officio oath and those who required it.
Sensing the impact of Lilburne's inflammatory words upon the crowd,
a royal officer had him gagged; but not to be suppressed, Lilburne
threw pamphlets to his audience, and, when the supply of these was
exhausted, stamped his feet to show his defiance.
Returned to the Fleet to remain until he took the oath, Lilburne
shrewdly passed his time in writing. Manuscripts detailing the injus-
tices visited upon him and condemning the ex officio oath flew from
his cell like bats from a cave. Smuggled to Holland and published
there, Lilburne's writings were returned to England to be read by a
growing army of supporters.
"Freeborn" John Lilburne attracted the attention of Englishmen to
his problems with the Star Chamber at a time when the English were
discarding feudalism and its legal trappings as the basis for internal
order. The English House of Commons and the common law courts
had assumed an anti-feudal stance, although both had stemmed indi-
rectly from feudal roots. The prerogative courts, more recent develop-
ments from the King's Council, tended to reflect antiquated feudal
ideas of kingship. Lilburne and his dissenting associates marshalled
major public support for their position and were able to force a royal
government, with a basis of power already much eroded, to surrender
a number of its important institutions. The ex officio oath and the two
courts which used it in matters of crime and ill-fame, the High Com-
mission and Star Chamber, were abolished by the Parliament in 1641.
The destruction of legal institutions reflected a broad political con-
flict in which people and careers also were destroyed. Strafford, the
chief minister of Charles I, was hurried to the block in 1641 by an act
of attainder-voted to death by a legislative body. Archbishop Laud,
the guiding spirit of the High Commission and Star Chamber, shortly
placed his neck on the same block. Their master, Charles I, met the
same fate in 1649, condemned to death without being permitted to
make a statement in his own defense. Thus, very harshly, the royal
establishment was extirpated.
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Lilburne continued his stormy course in the Commonwealth of Oli-
ver Cromwell. Although the ex officio oath was gone, he asserted his
right against self-incrimination before committees of the House of
Commons. Jailed for breaching the privileges of Parliament, he was
more trouble in jail than out. His numerous tracts and pamphlets
were a constant threat to the order of the Commonwealth. Tried for
high treason in 1649, he successfully asserted his right against compul-
sory self-incrimination before an Extraordinary Commission of Oyer
and Terminer consisting of many of the legal notables of the day. Ac-
quitted by the jury, but his legal troubles by no means at an end, he
had, by the end of his life, brought the right against self-incrimination
from its status as a defense to the oath ex officio in the prerogative
courts to an accepted principle in common law criminal procedure.
When Lilburne died in 1657, a year before the death of Cromwell,
he could look back on a path strewn with the ruins of courts, proce-
dures, people, and, indeed, of a social fabric. This is not surprising in
view of the ability and persuasiveness of this combative dissenter. If
he could have looked from his prison at Dover in 1657, he would have
observed the dismal tyranny of Cromwell's major generals, certainly
not a welcome sight for a man who revelled in dissent. Yet many prin-
ciples associated with the freedom of individuals spring from the dy-
ing gasps of political systems and, as Professor Levy writes:
Lilburne had made the difference. From his time on, the right
against self-incrimination was an established, respected rule of the
common law, or more broadly, of English law generally.'
Had Professor Levy confined himself to a description of Lilburne
and his times, he would have had a difficult enough task. But not con-
tent with this, Professor Levy, who is Earl Warren Professor of Con-
stitutional History at Brandeis University, traces the development of
the principle against compulsory self-incrimination from its amor-
phous thirteenth-century beginnings to its inclusion in the Fifth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution. He does so brilliantly, and
no one who has attempted to trace a constitutional principle through
the morass of medieval, Tudor and Stuart law can fail to appreciate
the monumental task which Professor Levy has accomplished. It is
not likely that his extensive research upon the subject will be paral-
leled or most of the conclusions from his study seriously questioned.
1. L. LEvy, OmciNs oF THE FIFR AmF.ND. uT: THE RIGHr AcAiNST SELF-I CRLILAT1O.
313 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Lxvy].
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Perhaps no constitutional principle has had or does have so vexed
a life as the doctrine against compulsory self-incrimination. This is
because the doctrine, apart from its relationship to freedom of the in-
dividual, operates as an obstacle to the intelligence (fact-gathering)
processes of the governing elite. The rumbling of complaint has been
heard in the past, and is heard today, when a right against compulsory
self-incrimination is asserted by the defendant for his personal benefit,
blocking in the process the finding of facts concerning conspiracy, sub-
version or the formation and operations of any combination thought
by the public to be of possible danger to the community.
In dealing with the historical background of the self-incrimination
doctrine, Professor Levy is dealing with a history of revolutionary tech.
nique. The doctrine was and is the major defense of the revolutionist.
In establishing it, the revolutionaries pushed the ruling powers from
position to position, the rulers compromising in ways which they con-
sidered least damaging to them upon the assumption at each position
that the status quo could be maintained.
Principles important to the rulers tend to be defended until the end
-eventually to fall as their power is yielded up. Under the new re-
gime, some of the new principles established in the death of the old
elite also die. But, others survive, and it was the fortune of the princi-
ple against compulsory self-incrimination, conceded at the last by the
Stuarts, to survive not only the Commonwealth of Cromwell, but the
Stuart Restoration in 1660 as well.
With conflict of this character and intensity as the breeding ground
of the constitutional principle, it is not surprising that Professor Levy
emphasizes in the organization of his study a series of battles of under.
dogs against oppressors. The dramatic way in which the book is orga.
nized, as a series of duels in which the underdogs usually, but not al-
ways, emerge victorious, may have had a great deal to do with its en-
thusiastic reception. But the popular appeal of the book should not
obscure the sound scholarship that produced it. In his first two chap.
ters, Professor Levy describes the historical background of the Tudor
and Stuart contests concerning self-incrimination. He first compares
common law and ecclesiastical criminal procedures. He then considers
the development and use of the ex officio oath in the ecclesiastical and
prerogative courts and the use of the oath in securing conformity to
the twists and turns of Tudor political and religious policy through
the reign of Mary (1553-1558).
Common law criminal procedures were essentially accusatorial. The
judge was a referee, the case being decided by a jury which heard facts
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offered by a complainant and defendant. Ecclesiastical criminal pro-
cedures were essentially inquisitorial. The judge had the initiative in
finding facts by interrogating the witnesses. He could commence the
case and then hear and decide it.
An independent ecclesiastical court system was introduced into Eng-
land at the time of the Norman Conquest (1066). Until Henry VIII's
Act of Supremacy in 1534, the English ecclesiastical courts were
branches of an international court system of the Roman Church. In
their procedural developments, the ecclesiastical courts were much in
advance of the courts of common law, and ecclesiastical procedures
served as models for early common law remedies in the civil field. In
the area of crime, however, the ecclesiastical and common law courts
took different routes, the ecclesiastical criminal procedures being
much affected by the Roman law with certain embellishments contrib-
uted by the canon lawyers.
The major canon law embellishment was the ex officio oath, so-
called because the judge required it by virtue of his office. The oath
was formalized at the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 (the same year
as Magna Charta), being designed to assist in the discovery of heretics.
The use of the oath became general in the ecclesiastical courts, being
used in testamentary and matrimonial matters, for example, although
there is no indication of its use to root out heresy or in criminal mat-
ters in England until 1246. The oath of which Lilburne so bitterly
complained in the Star Chamber thus had ancient roots, and perhaps
never would have stimulated such monumental opposition in the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries had it been confined to the usual
kinds of criminal cases which were presented to the ecclesiastical
courts.
After the Act of Supremacy in 1534, which made Henry VIII head of
both church and state, heresy became identified with treason. The
ex officio oath became the major fact-finding tool of a new group of
courts, the prerogative or "conciliar" courts. These developed from
the King's Council, as did the courts of common law. Some, such as
the Court of Chancery and Star Chamber, antedated the Tudors. But
the Tudors reinforced the powers of these courts and assigned them
roles of enhancing the efficiency of administration of the royal govern-
ment and of securing conformity to the new arrangement of church
and state in one political head.
The newest of the prerogative courts, less than a century old at the
time of Lilburne's trial before the Star Chamber, was the Court of
High Commission. Historians know less about this court than any
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other which the English political system produced, and Professor
Levy's book sheds new light upon its work.2 The institution origi-
nated in a commission granted to Thomas Cromwell by Henry VIII,
but did not undertake judicial tasks as a matter of routine until 1557
under a Marian commission. The High Commission was at first under
the close supervision of the King's Council. But in 1583, under the
leadership of Archbishop Whitgift, it received substantial indepen-
dence. Enjoying the full confidence of Queen Elizabeth, Whitgift
transformed the High Commission into a major investigative and ju-
dicial agency geared to the discovery of Catholic and Puritan subver-
sion. Its use of the ex officio oath reflected this function.
Professor Levy devotes four chapters to Elizabethan developments
relevant to the compulsory self-incrimination issue. Before the reign
of Elizabeth I, few of that sombre procession of dissenters who tool
the final road to Tyburn or to Smithfield had escaped an encounter
with the ex officio oath. But even fewer seem to have objected to the
oath on the ground of compulsory self-incrimination. John Lambert
did so in 1532 to the extent that the oath was used to reveal crimes
that were unknown or unproved. Tyndale and Christopher St. Ger-
main inveighed against the oath in treatises and pamphlets. But the
frantic efforts by Elizabeth and her Council to counter Catholic and
Puritan subversion brought the self incrimination feature of the oath
into focus.
Under Elizabeth's extended repression of dissent, many lawyers, ei-
ther Catholics or Puritans, were trapped personally in the toils of the
High Commission. The first statement by a common law judge con-
cerning the self-incrimination doctrine as involved in the ex officio
oath was made in 1568, relative to a writ of habeas corpus to release
Thomas Leigh, a Catholic lawyer practicing before the Court of Coln-
mon Pleas, who had been committed by the High Commission for
contempt.3 In the 1590's, James Morice, a Puritan lawyer, grounded
opposition to the ex officio oath upon Magna Charta, following an
2. The only text is R. UsHEn, THE RISE AND FAIL OF THE I-IIoT COaMMIS31ON (19191).
A discussion of the Commission by most legal historians is minimal, usually on the
ground of its extensive non-judicial functions.
3. There was a later incursion of the ex officio oath into the common law criminal
procedure in the case of Nicholas Udall, one of the famous teachers and authors of
his time, who was examined before the High Commission and then indicted and placed
on trial for his life in the Assizes. He was charged with violation of a statute of 1581
pertaining to seditious libel against the Queen. The Assize Commissioners pressed him
to swear under oath whether or not he had written the book which gave rise to the
indictment. Udall sturdily asserted his right against self-incrimination.
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earlier statement of the point by Robert Beale, Secretary of the Privy
Council. In his "Briefe Treatise of Oathes Exacted by Ordinaries and
Ecclesiastical Judges," Morice struck effectively at the procedures of
the High Commission. He marshalled for this purpose historical ma-
terial that later was useful to advocates of Parliamentary supremacy
and to those (such as Sir Edward Coke) who asserted the power of the
King's Bench and other common law courts to interfere with proce-
dures before the various conciliar tribunals.
Professor Levy observes that at the end of Elizabeth's reign Whitgift
and his High Commission were still firmly established despite the new
wave of opposition. And indeed Whitgift was! Substantially free from
control by the Council and with little risk of interference from a Par-
liament controlled by Elizabeth, Whitgift and his fellows proceeded
from excess to excess. From time to time the Commission did uncover
a group of subversives, such as the Conventicle of Separatists in 1587.
Such proof that the Commission was performing its role of public se-
curity insured its life and cloaked its function as an engine of political
and religious oppression.
Frustrated in their efforts in the House of Commons to secure relief
from the heavy hand of the High Commission, the Puritans turned to
the common law courts. Until 1616, when Sir Edward Coke was re-
moved by James I as Chief Justice of the King's Bench, these courts
were the major vehicle for Puritan opposition to the work of the High
Commission and Star Chamber. The self-incrimination feature of the
ex officio oath was an ideal spike by which the fact-finding procedures
of both courts could be blocked.
Vhile the battle lines were drawn by the earlier Puritan opposition
to the High Commission, there had been a long history of conflict be-
tween the common law and ecclesiastical courts. The two procedures
used by the common law courts to block the work of the High Com-
mission were the writs of prohibition and habeas corpus. By the writ
of prohibition, proceedings before the High Commission could be
halted; and by the -writ of habeas corpus, a defendant committed for
contempt could be released. In 1607, Nicholas Fuller, a lawyer who
represented many Puritans, provided the first major test of the com-
mon law procedures. In seeking a writ of habeas corpus for a client
imprisoned by the High Commission, Fuller made slanderous remarks
before the King's Bench concerning the High Commission, and was
imprisoned by the Commission for his intemperate statements. The
argument which he would have made to a joint session of the com-
mon law judges (had he not been in prison) was published, and was a
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major contribution to the later arguments of Coke and Lilburne. Pro-
fessor Levy writes:
[T]he struggle for the right against self-incrimination was inti-
mately connected with, and in some respects triggered, the greater
struggle for constitutional liberty by the Commons and the com-
mon-law courts against an unlimited royal prerogative. Coke
owed much to Fuller who, in turn, was indebted to Beale and
Morice. All four relied on Magna Carta to combat the inquisitor-
ial procedures of the ecclesiastical courts. The Great Charter first
emerged as a "liberty document" in their opposition to the oath
ex officio.4
A final example of the struggle between the common law and con.
ciliar courts occurred in Coke's last year in office (1616), in which he
decided Burrowes and Others v. The High Commission. Coke held the
High Commission limited to the use of the oath only in testamentary
and matrimonial cases, declaring that even if the High Commission
had jurisdiction, they could not examine on oath in a criminal case
because that would "make one thereby to subject himself to the danger
of a penal law." He declared illegal both the ex officio oath and a de-
nial to the defendant of the articles upon which he was to be exam-
ined.
Coke's fall from grace in 1616 signalled a temporary end to major
controversy concerning the ex officio oath. Professor Levy suggests sev-
eral reasons for this. Apart from the issue of Coke's personal prestige,
which had rested upon his success in driving home his points concern.
ing High Commission procedures, the use of prohibitions subsided be-
cause the lawyers of the common law courts, who had used the writ of
prohibition to acquire ecclesiastical practice and that of other preroga-
tive courts, had virtually destroyed ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the
most lucrative areas. Ecclesiastical supervision over the administration
of estates, for example, had completely broken down. It may well have
been that the interest of the lawyers of the common law courts in in-
creasing their practice in civil areas was just as important as the
opposition of the Puritans to the ex officio oath and the High Com-
mission in maintaining the common law pressure upon the church
court system. Perhaps Coke had prolonged this pressure for his own
personal interest after the general support by the bar of his court had
diminished.
With the Stuart talent for fanning fire from smouldering embers,
4. LEvY 235.
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Charles I and Archbishop Laud revived the controversy concerning
the oath. With no royal control over the House of Commons, the con-
troversy now centered there. In the mid-1630's Laud brought the Star
Chamber into a close relationship with the High Commission as a
state security agency, and both courts were then convenient targets for
Lilburne and others who could count on substantial Parliamentary
support. The arguments concerning compulsory self-incrimination
had been spelled out by Morice, Fuller, and Coke. Lilburne and his
colleagues carried the principle, once a weapon against the High Com-
mission, into the courts of common law where it was established as
part of a common law constitutional tradition.
Professor Levy considers the steps by which the right against self-in-
crimination was secured as part of the unwritten English constitution
in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, and then exam-
ines the seventeenth-century American colonial experience. He en-
counters here the obstacle baffling all legal historians of seventeenth-
century America-the lack of records. He nevertheless considers it
likely that the right against self-incrimination was recognized in some
of the colonies. He differs in this respect from Professors Goebel and
Naughton, who argue that in colonial New York, at least, no such
right existed.5
The matter is much complicated by conflicting theories concerning
the degree to which the common law applied in the colonies. The ex-
perience of each colony was also different. It is the reviewer's opinion
that so long as the common law jury was used extensively, the defen-
dant probably would not be required to offer incriminating evidence
against himself, and that the jury would be alerted not to draw
inferences from the failure of the defendant to testify. Whether a judge
would view the right as founded in common law or simply as elemen-
tal fairness in a case in which no conspiracy or subversion was sus-
pected we will never know. But the reviewer is inclined to side with
Professor Levy.
In the later eighteenth century, lawyers trained in the Inns of
Court should have brought a sharp appreciation of the common law
position concerning compulsory self-incrimination into the jurispru-
dence of the colonies. The work of these professionals, and the in-
creasing circulation of English law books, make it quite likely that
the right against self-incrimination was recognized in many of the
5. J. GOEBEL & T. NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORcEnwr iN COLONL NEW You,: A STuDY
IN ChDMIL PRocEDURE (1664-1776) 656 (1944).
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colonies in the years immediately preceding the Revolution. The
right was certainly nothing new to the men who framed the first state
constitutions and the federal Fifth Amendment, most of whom were
products of the colonial legal experience.
The shortest and last of Professor Levy's chapters deals with the
framing of the state and federal constitutional provisions and the
debates that led to the very restrictive wording of the right in the
Fifth Amendment. Professor Levy writes:
The Fifth Amendment, even with the self-incrimination clause
restricted to criminal cases, still put its principle broadly enough
to apply to witnesses and to any phase of the proceedings.
The clause by its terms also protected against more than just
"self-incrimination," a phrase that had never been used in the
long history of its origins and development. The "right against
self-incrimination" is a short-hand gloss of modern origin that
implies a restriction not in the constitutional clause. The right
not to be a witness against oneself imports a principle of wider
reach, applicable, at least in criminal cases, to the self-production
of any adverse evidence, including evidence that made one the
herald of his own infamy, thereby publicly disgracing him. The
clause extended, in other words, to all the injurious as well as
incriminating consequences of disclosure by witness or party. But
this inference drawn from the wording of the clause enjoys the
support of no proof based on American experience, as distin-
guished from English, before the nineteenth century. Clearly,
however, to speak merely of a right against self-incrimination
stunts the wider right not to give evidence against oneself, as the
Virginia model put it, or not to be a witness against oneself, as
the Fifth Amendment stated. The previous history of the right,
both in England and America, proves that it was not bound by
rigid definition. After the adoption of the Fifth Amendment, the
earliest state and federal cases were in accord with that previous
history, which suggests that whatever the wording of the constitu.
tional formulation, it did not supersede or even limit the com-
mon-law right."
Professor Levy thus argues that the common law history of the
right against self-incrimination is essential to the construction of the
self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment. Whether or not
this argument is fully accepted, his book, with its wealth of detailed
information, will clearly be of value to lawyers. But there is a lesson
here for the non-lawyer citizen as well.
Professor Levy deals only episodically with the intelligence processes
6. Lzvy 427-28.
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of the various establishments under attack and perhaps was not greatly
interested in this aspect of the problem. Thus, the relationship of the
ex officio oath and the self-incrimination problem to the domestic
intelligence processes of the Tudor and Stuart governments appears
only in flashes here and there in the book. There would, however,
have been no High Commission if the Tudors and Stuarts had been
able to obtain an adequate and reliable flow of domestic intelligence
from other sources. The sheriffs and justices of the peace, once good
information sources, had been brought under the control of the House
of Commons, an institution from which little sound information was
passed to the Council. The old General Eyre, which had been a
major information source, had fallen into disuse. The Privy Council
relied increasingly for information upon paid informers, such as
Chilliburne, whose information led to the arrest of Lilburne, upon
the prerogative courts, and especially upon the High Commission.
The Church knew what people were thinking and the High Commis-
sion was at the apex of the Church intelligence system. Attacks upon
the ex officio oath, either in the High Commission or in lower ecclesi-
astical courts were, from one point of view, attacks to block the flow of
intelligence to the Crown.
When Lilburne attempted arguments against forced divulgences of
information before a House of Commons committee shortly after
abolition of the ex officio oath, the High Commission and the Star
Chamber, he received a practical demonstration in prison of the
determination and power of a "new" establishment that needed in-
formation and was going to get it. Perhaps even the concession to
Lilburne by the Cromwellian Commissioners in Oyer and Terminer
was by yet another "new" establishment that had well-rooted informa-
tion sources in a new military and political organization and could
afford generosity on the point.
The common law courts, dealing to a great extent with peasants
who are notoriously reticent to give any information, had long before
the time of the High Commission gone over to a "do it yourself" type
of jurisprudence. Juries found facts and made decisions. If peasants
would not talk to officials, they would sometimes talk to one another.
One is reminded of Arthur Koestler's description in Darkness at Noon
of the Soviet interrogator, Gletkin, who sought to obtain the peasant's
corn by preaching patriotism-while the latter stood silently and un-
hearing, picking his nose. We are all peasants under the skin, hostile to
tax collectors and edgy around the police, and governments thus have
to deal with millions of peasants "picking their noses."
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A reader concerned with events of the future, rather than with the
sentiment and excitement of past opposition, will see in our current
federal government a complex of institutions whose domestic intelli-
gence resources, despite their computers, are producing much informa-
tion of little reliability. Poor intelligence sources are being tapped or
information is not reported reliably. It may be that the people who
know will not talk. This is not precisely the problem confronted by
the Tudors and Stuarts, but so far as governmental response is con-
cerned, the pattern is likely to be the same. An establishment that
cannot obtain accurate information will not survive; and before it is
starved for facts it will establish its "High Commission." This may be
the major lesson which Professor Levy's book should teach, and if the
lesson taught is true, many of us may live to see the Fifth Amendment
severely tested.
1630
Vol. 79: 1618, 1970
